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INTRODUCTION

The rise of social media platforms has simplified individuals’ ability to form
deep connections and maintain better communication with members of their
communities as well as with loved ones, friends, work colleagues, and others
across the globe. While social media has many positive impacts in society, the
trend of increasing digitalization across the globe also arguably gives rise to
many unanticipated, destructive externalities. These negative externalities range
from the improper use of user data by corporate entities to the exploitation of the
powerful reach of social media by terrorist organizations.1
Member states of the United Nations (U.N.) have taken some steps to counter
the harmful byproducts of the social media revolution, such as the Tech Against
Terrorism initiative, which “promote[s] constructive working relationships between the tech and government sectors” to “tackle terrorist use of the internet
whilst respecting human rights.”2 While the U.N. has taken steps to address many
of the negative side effects of social media, there are ongoing concerns regarding
how the international community can address the economic incentives of social
media corporations and the unique nature of social media platforms that encourage exploitation of users.3 One inherent difficulty in promoting international
standards for social media corporations and platforms is that government actors
arguably have a strong incentive to utilize user data collected by social media
platforms as a means of monitoring and manipulating public opinion. This government incentive makes it difficult for the international community to reach a
consensus on standards that states will hold themselves to when interacting with
social media corporations and user data.
Some bodies have formulated concrete protections of individual rights and
user data, such as the European Union’s privacy law from 2016, the General Data
Protection Regulation.4 However, these developments have not been echoed
worldwide, and many communities likely still face exploitation of their data by
corporate and government actors. Questions remain as to how the international
community can address the exploitation of social media platforms by

1

Alex Voloshin, Social Media Corporations: International Law and the Regulation of
Social Media Abuse, SEMINAR ON CORP. & INT’L L. (May 9, 2018).
2
About Tech Against Terrorism, TECH AGAINST TERRORISM, https://www.techagainstterrorism.org/about/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2020).
3
Social Media’s Moral Reckoning: Changing the Terms of Engagement with Silicon Valley, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Dec. 21, 2018, 6:01 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/12/21/social-medias-moral-reckoning.
4
Commission Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1.
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government actors and how domestic actors can pressure foreign states and international corporations to comply with international law.
Some of the most egregious abuses and manipulation of user data have occurred in China, where the Chinese State enacted a repressive surveillance regime in the Xinjiang province over its Uyghur Muslim population in the name
of national security.5 Examinations of the Chinese regime in Xinjiang reveal that
the State is facilitating “segregated surveillance,” where security personnel force
the Uyghur Muslim population to “submit to monitoring and data collection
while generally ignoring the majority Han Chinese, who make up 36 percent of
Xinjiang’s population.”6 The Chinese government procures surveillance equipment to use in Xinjiang from large state-owned enterprises such as the China
Electronics Technology Corporation and Chinese multinational tech firms such
as Hikvision and Huawei.7 The Chinese State has placed potentially “as many as
1.5 million Uyghurs and members of other Muslim minorities” into “re-education and detention centers,” which are used to promote loyalty to the Communist
Party.8
This note seeks to examine the various international legal mechanisms and
regimes that could support a finding of corporate liability in situations where tech
companies have played a large role in government abuses of human rights and
examines potential alternatives at the regional and transnational levels. First, this
note will closely examine the ongoing Chinese surveillance regime in the Xinjiang province and international responses to the Chinese corporate actors’ conduct. This first section also discusses China’s political strength on the international stage and the state’s perception of and attitude towards its international
legal obligations. Second, this note will explore the relative lack of relevant applicable international law and regulations to this issue, which is the product of
both rapid technological development and political incentives for states to exploit
and manipulate user data. Third, this note will examine international responses
to the challenges of the social media and technological revolution on the regional
level, as well as states’ domestic policies aimed at ensuring corporate responsibility for human rights violations and protection of user data.
Lastly, this note will argue that existing international legal mechanisms are
insufficient to protect user data and prevent human rights abuses facilitated by
exploiting digital channels. Existing international criminal legal regimes cannot
realistically hold many corporate actors liable for their international crimes,
5

Chris Buckley & Paul Mozur, How China Uses High-Tech Surveillance to Subdue Minorities, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/22/world/asia/chinasurveillance-xinjiang.html.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Nick Cumming-Bruce, U.S. Steps Up Criticism of China for Detentions in Xinjiang,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/13/world/asia/china-muslimxinjiang.html?module=inline.
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much less those who state actors shield. Given China’s role on the U.N. Security
Council and its overall influence in East Asia and worldwide, this paper argues
that existing international law and international legal mechanisms fail to effectively hold Chinese corporate actors accountable for their human rights abuses
in the Xinjiang province.
Instead, individual states must work with corporate actors, such as executives
in tech firms and the social media industry, to promote responsible handling of
user data. Furthermore, individual states must develop comprehensive transnational sanction regimes that target those international corporate entities that facilitate human rights abuses. This push for widespread initiatives on the domestic
level could realistically form customary international legal obligations and
would encourage the creation of stronger multilateral legal instruments.

II.

BACKGROUND

A. Internet Regulation, Digital Surveillance, and Human Rights Violations
in China

i.

Internet Regulation by the Chinese State

The Chinese State’s expansive regime of internet regulation has received increasingly heavy criticism by nations and other international actors in recent
years. Freedom House, an independent watchdog organization that “amplif[ies]
the voices of those struggling for freedom in repressive societies and counter
authoritarian efforts to weaken international scrutiny,”9 declared China “the
world’s worst abuser of internet freedom” in its 2019 Freedom on the Net report,
The Crisis of Social Media.10 China has implemented a number of domestic laws
and policies that not only heavily restrict the ability of domestic and foreign corporations to conduct work within the State, but also require companies to expressly support the Chinese government in its repression of civil rights and

9

About Us, FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/about-us (last visited Mar. 24,

2021).
10

Adrian Shahbaz & Allie Funk, Freedom on the Net 2019: The Crisis of Social Media,
FREEDOM HOUSE, https://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2019/crisis-social-media (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).
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political dissident within the State.11 As “[t]he community of Chinese Internet
users continues to grow,” the Chinese State has “simultaneously increase[d] its
capacity to restrict content that might threaten social stability or state control.”12
China’s sophisticated internet censorship regime is known informally as the
“Great Firewall,” largely due to its automated blocking of many websites and
services based outside China.13 This regime largely targets those that criticize the
leadership or policies of the Chinese Communist Party.14 Both domestic and international companies also face pressure to support the Chinese government’s
stance on disputed terms and policies, such as territorial claims.15 Chinese authorities use both publicly announced rules as introduced by regulatory bodies
and special measures that are “aimed at creating a stable online environment during a major [political] event” to tighten internet regulation when the Chinese
State feels the potential for political instability.16
International companies based outside of China face intense pressure to comply with the Chinese government’s policies or risk complete censorship of their
platforms and technology within China. The Chinese State has blocked internet
access to many international news outlets, especially those that host Chineselanguage websites.17 Most international social media platforms are completely
blocked in China, which has corresponded with exponential growth of Chinese
platforms such as Tencent’s WeChat.18 Other international internet platforms,
such as Google, have worked to develop platforms that comply with China’s
expansive censorship requirements.19 Apple and Microsoft, both of which censor
11
See Alexandra Stevenson, China’s Communists Rewrite the Rules for Foreign Businesses, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/13/business/chinacommunist-party-foreign-businesses.html.
12
China, OPENNET INITIATIVE, http://access.opennet.net/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/accesscontested-china.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2021)
13
Freedom on the Net 2019: China, FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/country/china/freedom-net/2019 (last visited Apr. 5, 2021) [hereinafter Freedom on the Net 2019:
China].
14
See Adrian Shahbaz & Allie Funk, Freedom on the Net 2020: The Pandemic’s Digital
Shadow, FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2020/pandemicsdigital-shadow (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).
15
China: Events of 2018, HUM. RTS. WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/china-and-tibet#eaa21f (last visited Apr. 6, 2021) (“In January
[2018], US-based Marriott International apologized for listing Taiwan and Tibet as separate
countries on its website after authorities shut down the website and app in China for a week.”).
16
Cheang Ming & Saheli Roy Choudhury, China Has Launched Another Crackdown on
the Internet – but It’s Different This Time, CNBC (Oct. 26, 2017, 8:06 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/26/china-internet-censorship-new-crackdowns-and-rulesare-here-to-stay.html.
17
Freedom on the Net 2019: China, supra note 13.
18
Id.
19
China: Events of 2018, supra note 15 (“Google, which suspended its search service in
China in 2010 citing censorship concerns, had been developing a censored search engine app
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certain conduct on their Chinese networks, have faced criticism from lawmakers
in the United States and from international groups for “helping to suppress rights
they declare as essential in their home markets.”20 Both Apple and Microsoft
have justified their participation in the Chinese market as helping promote opportunity and civil rights for the Chinese populace, but critics instead view this
compliance as making it “easier for the authorities to convince other foreign
companies to do the same.”21 Apple and Facebook additionally removed apps
and developed unique software to respectively conform with the Chinese State’s
policies in 2016.22 Critics argue that China’s internet policies, specifically those
enforced against foreign companies, represent a blatant violation of China’s
commitment “to a broad liberalization of trade in services, including data processing and telecommunications” that the State took on when it joined the World
Trade Organization in 2001.23
The Chinese government’s intensive internet regulations have resulted in a
growth of Chinese companies, many owned or at least partially controlled by the
State, that must comply with these restrictive rules and promote the Chinese government’s policies.24 Locally hosted websites in China must “proactively monitor content on their platforms and remove banned material from their platforms”
or “may face severe punishment for failure to comply.”25 In August of 2013, the
Chinese government issued a set of regulations called the “seven baselines,”
which forced Chinese companies to immediately shut down more than 100,000
accounts on their websites that did not comply with these rules.26 Sina Weibo, a
Chinese blogging platform similar to Twitter, experienced a seventy percent drop
in the number of posts on its platform between 2011 and 2013.27
The Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) oversees the telecommunications sector and regulates internet content.28 The CAC reports in turn to the
for the Chinese market. The app would reportedly comply with China’s expansive censorship
requirements by automatically identifying and filtering sites blocked by the Great Firewall,
China’s internet filtering system.”).
20
Tom Simonite, US Companies Help Censor the Internet in China, Too, WIRED (June 3,
2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/us-companies-help-censor-internet-china/.
21
Id. (quoting Charlie Smith, cofounder of Greatfire.org, which monitors Chinese censorship).
22
Freedom on the Net 2017: China, FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/country/china/freedom-net/2017 (last visited Apr. 6, 2021).
23
See, e.g., Tim Wu, China’s Online Censorship Stifles Trade, Too, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/04/opinion/china-censorship-internet.html.
24
Freedom on the Net 2019: China, supra note 13.
25
Id.
26
Elizabeth C. Economy, The Great Firewall of China: Xi Jinping’s Internet Shutdown,
GUARDIAN (June 29, 2018, 1:00 EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/jun/29/thegreat-firewall-of-china-xi-jinpings-internet-shutdown (reporting that one Chinese company
“shut down or ‘handled’ 100,000 Weibo accounts found to not comply with the new rules”).
27
Id. (referring to a study of 1.6 million Weibo users).
28
Freedom on the Net 2019: China, supra note 13.
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Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission, which is headed directly by Xi
Jinping,29 creating a direct line of communication from China’s leader to internet
regulators. The Chinese Communist Party also uses its Central Propaganda Department to oversee ideological trends in online content.30 Under this regime,
censorship decisions often “are arbitrary and inconsistent, largely because of the
amount of individuals and processes involved.”31 In June 2016, the CAC released
a “mobile internet apps information service regulation,” which requires companies that offer digital apps to manage content produced and posted by users.32
There are numerous examples of recently passed regulations by the Chinese
State that have further restricted the ability for businesses to host and produce
internet content in China. China’s Cybersecurity Law (CSL), which took effect
in 2017, imposed a myriad of guidelines and restrictions for Chinese and multinational companies engaged in internet business in China.33 These include increased requirements to censor, mandated data localization, real-name registration rules, and the obligation to assist security agencies with investigations.34
Additionally, the law requires that foreign companies store Chinese user data in
mainland China.35 In response to the heavy censorship requirements, companies
such as Beyondsoft have begun offering censorship services for other Chinese
platforms in order to ensure that these clients comply with Chinese domestic
laws.36 Other companies, such as Sina Weibo and China’s top news app, Jinri
Toutiao, have hired thousands of in-house content reviewers within the last few
years to comply with increasing pressure from the Chinese government.37 Furthermore, China issued regulations in May 2017 banning the publishing of online
news or information services by sites not licensed by the Chinese government.38
Under the CSL, businesses engaged in internet activities face a variety of monetary penalties and even detention for failing to comply with the various requirements of the law.39
29

Id.
Id.
31
Id.
32
Freedom on the Net 2017: China, supra note 22.
33
Freedom on the Net 2019: China, supra note 13.
34
Id.
35
Freedom on the Net 2017: China, supra note 22.
36
Li Yuan, Learning China’s Forbidden History, So They Can Censor It, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 2, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/02/business/china-internet-censor.html
(“Beyond-soft employs over 4,000 workers . . . at its content reviewing factories. That is up
from about 200 in 2016.”).
37
Freedom on the Net 2019: China, supra note 13.
38
Freedom on the Net 2017: China, supra note 22.
39
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Wangluo Anquan Fa (中华人民共和国网络安全法)
[Cybersecurity Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 7, 2016, effective June 1, 2017), art. 59–70, 2016 STANDING
COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG.
30
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Most relevant to this Note, however, are the Chinese internet laws that inordinately impact activists, minority groups, and other individuals that the Chinese
government deems dissident. The CAC and other Chinese governmental bodies
have routinely introduced new rules and guidelines that increasingly restrict usergenerated content.40 Human rights activists and their families have been subjected to targeted network disconnections during times of domestic turmoil.41
Article 12 of the CSL dictates that individuals “must not use the Internet to engage in activities endangering national security, national honor, and national interests.”42 Article 58 of the CSL allows the CAC “to take temporary measures
regarding network communications in a specially designated region” when a
“need to protect national security and the social public order” exists or when a
“major security incident[]” occurs.43 Furthermore, Article 24 mandates that “network operators,” or those companies and actors who engage in internet business,
require users to provide their real identity in order to use that service.44 User data
from social media accounts and other platforms are processed by the “Police
Cloud” system used by the Chinese government to track and predict the activities
of human rights activists, ethnic minorities, and political dissidents.45 When Chinese authorities conduct investigations based on some communication or content
perceived to be harmful to the interests of the Chinese State, these authorities
have the power to punish users for even private conversations between a small
number of people.46
Many of the Chinese companies that directly engage in production of surveillance tools for the Chinese State have received international criticism for their
role in the suppression of minority and dissident groups in China, with states

40

See Freedom on the Net 2019: China, supra note 13.
Id. (“Ding Zilin, one of the founders of Tiananmen Mothers, a group of activists who
lost loved ones during the Tiananmen Square protests, was closely monitored in the weeks
leading up to the June 4 anniversary in 2019, and her mobile phone connection was reportedly
cut off.”).
42
Cybersecurity Law of the People’s Republic of China, art. 12.
43
Id. art. 58 (allowing the government to “limit[]” network communications that threaten
national security or the social public order).
44
Id. art. 24 (“Network operators . . . shall require users to provide real identity information when signing agreements with users or confirming the provision of services. Where
users do not provide real identity information, network operators must not provide them with
relevant services.”).
45
China: Police ‘Big Data’ Systems Violate Privacy, Target Dissent, HUM. RTS. WATCH
(Nov. 19, 2017, 7:50 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/11/19/china-police-big-data-systems-violate-privacy-target-dissent#.
46
See Freedom on the Net 2019: China, supra note 13 (“In April 2018, . . . [police were
instructed to] investigate an individual who had criticized Xi Jinping in a WeChat group with
only eight members. Though the individual had used a pseudonym, the instructions identified
him with his real name, address, and phone number.”).
41
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such as the United States putting Chinese companies on “trading blacklists.”47
Despite this international pressure, the sheer size of China’s population, in combination with the government’s restrictions on foreign businesses and content,
have helped cultivate the domestic Chinese tech industry. This domestic industry
is heavily influenced and controlled by the Chinese State, and the government
arguably utilizes this power dynamic to promote political stability and the Communist Party’s interests.
ii. The Role of Social Media and Digital Surveillance in the Persecution
of the Uyghur People in the Xinjiang Region of China
Since early 2017, Chinese authorities have detained at least 800,000 and possibly more than two million Uyghurs and members of other Muslim minorities
in internment camps.48 This policy of detainment continues the pattern of human
rights abuses against these communities by the Chinese State in the Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region.49 As a part of this pattern of acts against the Uyghur population, the Chinese State has required that social media platforms such
as the Chinese platform WeChat allow the government to monitor the activity of
its users.50 WeChat now actively requires users to provide voice samples and
facial scans in order to use the platform.51 Government officials have targeted
some users for their communication via WeChat with relatives living abroad.52
Other companies, such as Chinese artificial intelligence giant iFlytek, have supplied technology to officers of the Chinese State that is utilized to heavily monitor the Uyghur populace.53 The government has also forced residents of the Xinjiang province to download an app, JingWang, that scans devices for particular

47
Isobel Asher Hamilton, The US Blacklisted Some of China’s Most Valuable AI Startups
over Human Rights Issues in a Dramatic Trade War Escalation, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 8, 2019,
5:49 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/us-blacklists-china-ai-startups-2019-10.
48
Megan Keller, State Dept. Official: China Holding 800k Muslim Minorities in Internment Camps, HILL (Dec. 5, 2018, 12:09 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/419855-state-dept-official-china-holding-800k-uighurs-others-in-internment.
49
The China Challenge: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on E. Asia, the Pac., & Int’l Cybersecurity Pol’y of the S. Comm. on Foreign Rels., 115th Cong. 85–91 (2018) (statement of
Scott Busby, Deputy Assistant Sec’y, Hum. Rts. & Lab., U.S. Dep’t of State).
50
Isobel Cockerell, Inside China’s Massive Surveillance Operation, WIRED (May 9, 2019,
7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/inside-chinas-massive-surveillance-operation/.
51
See Stephen McDonell, China Social Media: WeChat and the Surveillance State, BBC
NEWS (June 7, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-china-blog-48552907.
52
See Freedom on the Net 2019: China, supra note 13.
53
Isobel Cockerell, supra note 50.
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files and collects data from users.54 This program is designed to search for files
that match content blacklisted by the Chinese State.55 The Chinese government
also has the power to disable popular social media apps in Xinjiang and does so
in order to “clean” religious content and other material deemed extremist by the
State.56 It further detained Muslim residents of Xinjiang for privately celebrating
the independence of Kazakhstan from the Soviet Union.57 While the Chinese
government has denied the existence of these camps, observers have cited public
projects and expenditures by the Chinese government in the Xinjiang region as
well as steady development of China’s “re-education” systems in the region as
clear evidence supporting their existence.58
States and organizations have begun responding to the Chinese State’s repressive tactics in Xinjiang with sanctions against those Chinese security and surveillance firms that aid the State in committing human rights abuses. In October
of 2019, the U.S. government decided to blacklist top Chinese-based surveillance
companies in response to reports of the ongoing human rights abuses in Xinjiang.59 However, these sanctions constitute export controls on U.S. origin goods,
instead of the more onerous Magnitsky sanctions that the U.S. government can
impose on foreign actors for human rights abuses.60 The United States had previously banned U.S. technology companies from selling products to Huawei, the
54

Joseph Cox, Chinese Government Forces Residents to Install Surveillance App with
Awful Security, VICE (Apr. 9, 2018, 12:00 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/ne94dg/jingwang-app-no-encryption-china-force-install-urumqi-xinjiang.
55
Freedom on the Net 2019: China, supra note 13.
56
See, e.g., Wenxin Fan, China Appears to Block Social-Media Platform Clubhouse After
Brief Flourishing of Debate, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 8, 2021, 11:51 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-appears-to-block-social-media-platform-clubhouse-after-brief-flourishing-of-debate-11612810286 (“Beijing’s censors appeared to slam the door on Clubhouse, Silicon Valley’s latest social-media hit, after a frenzied week in which the audio-only chat app helped
spark a rare outpouring of freewheeling debate on taboo topics in the Chinese-speaking
world.”).
57
Freedom on the Net 2018: China, FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2018/china (last visited Apr. 7, 2021) (“In December 2017, around 40 ethnic
Kazakhs were arrested for disseminating content in WeChat groups that celebrated the independence of Republic of Kazakhstan from the Soviet Union.”).
58
Adrian Zenz, New Evidence for China’s Political Re-education Campaign in Xinjiang,
JAMESTOWN FOUND. (May 15, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://jamestown.org/program/evidence-forchinas-political-re-education-campaign-in-xinjiang/ (“This article demonstrates that there is,
in fact, a substantial body of PRC governmental sources that prove the existence of the camps.
Furthermore, the PRC government’s own sources broadly corroborate some estimates by
rights groups of number of individuals interred in the camps.”).
59
Charles Rollet, Xinjiang Backlash Is Hitting Chinese Firms Hard, FOREIGN POL’Y (Oct.
18, 2019, 11:58 AM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/18/xinjiang-sanctions-chinesefirms-surveillance/ (“The entities affected include the world’s two largest security camera
manufacturers and three multibillion-dollar facial recognition start-ups.”).
60
Id. (explaining that Magnitsky sanctions “would ban all transactions between covered
entities and the United States”).
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Chinese telecommunication giant, but in 2019 the United States began issuing
licenses to some firms to allow them to sell to the Chinese company.61
In June of 2020, the United States passed the Uyghur Human Rights Policy
Act of 2020, which requires various U.S. government bodies to report human
rights abuses by the Chinese government against the Uyghur population in Xinjiang.62 In this Act, the United States specifically cited the policies and detentions
in Xinjiang as violating China’s international human rights law obligations under
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.63 Politicians in the United
Kingdom, Germany, and the Netherlands are also raising concerns about Chinese
firms that either produce products for the European market or design intensive
security apparatuses for the Chinese State authorities.64
While U.S. sanctions have had some effect on the market performance of Chinese firms that assist in human rights abuse, some U.S. politicians have argued
that forming multilateral sanction regimes with partners such as the EU would
more effectively deter such conduct by these Chinese companies and influence
the conduct of the Chinese State by association.65 Although the EU has decried
China for some of its human rights abuses, it has received criticism for not more
firmly pressing China on the human rights violations in Xinjiang during the 2019
EU-China Summit.66
China’s influence on the global stage, extensive financial capital, and increasing domestic technology sector have arguably hampered the efforts of individual
states and the international community at large to hold Chinese corporations and
their controlling governmental actors liable for human rights violations in Xinjiang. Both the Council on Foreign Relations and Freedom House, two major
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that focus on international issues, have
cited a report by the New York Times that China has exported its artificial
61
Sherisse Pham, Huawei Will Soon Be Able to Buy from Some U.S. Suppliers Again,
CNN BUS. (Nov. 22, 2019, 2:21 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/11/21/tech/huawei-us-licenses/index.html.
62
Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020, Pub. L. No. 116–145, § 1, 134 Stat. 648,
652.
63
Id. § 3(2)–(3).
64
Rollet, supra note 59.
65
Id. (“If U.S. allies like the European Union were to join such a new trade regime, the
potential to affect China’s actual domestic policies would be much greater than by blacklisting
a few surveillance companies.”).
66
Keegan Elmer, EU Calls Out Beijing on Human Rights but Activists Want Harder Line
Against China’s Xinjiang and Tibet Policy, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Apr. 10, 2019, 2:30
PM), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3005510/eu-calls-out-china-human-rights-stops-short-pressing-beijing (“European Council President Donald Tusk said the
union raised human rights with China, but he did not say which issues were brought up.”).
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intelligence and surveillance technology to various States in South America and
Africa.67 The widespread use of these advanced surveillance systems promotes
the type of monitoring that the Chinese State has used on its population and could
arguably increase the chance of serious human rights violations against the population by the State and its powerful corporate allies.
The Chinese State has hired private companies and groups to create virtual
accounts, including bot accounts, on social media sites such as Twitter to spread
disinformation and to amplify messages beneficial to the interests of the Chinese
Community Party.68 The Chinese State has continually pushed for an increased
presence of Communist Party members within the leadership of Chinese private
firms, leading to increased alignment of these firms’ objectives and policies with
those of the State.69 In 2016, China’s leader, Xi Jinping, instructed the top official
media organizations in China to modify their platforms and narratives to increase
global influence.70 These concerted efforts to spread Chinese State propaganda
and technology, combined with China’s position on the U.N. Security Council
and overall influence on the global stage, have made it difficult for the international community to hold Chinese corporations liable for their complicity and
assistance in the human rights abuses against the Uyghur population of the Xinjiang region.71
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Olivia Enos, Responding to the Crisis in Xinjiang, HERITAGE FOUND. (June 7, 2019),
https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/responding-the-crisis-xinjiang (citing Arthur Gwagwa &
Lisa Garbe, Exporting Repression? China’s Artificial Intelligence Push into Africa, COUNCIL
ON FOREIGN RELS. (Dec. 17, 2018, 10:00 AM); Adrian Shahbaz, Freedom on the Net 2018:
The Rise of Digital Authoritarianism, FREEDOM HOUSE (last visited Apr. 7, 2021)) (referencing
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regulators pressured private firms listed on the country’s stock exchanges to ‘strengthen partybuilding’ within their ranks; official sources reported in 2017 that 70 percent of private companies in China had internal party organizations.”).
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TIMES (Aug 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/20/business/china-hong-kong-social-media-soft-power.html (“Xinhua, CCTV, Global Times and the rest have bolstered their
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B. The Development of International and Transnational Regulations of the
Internet and Corporate Conduct Regarding Data Privacy

i. Internet Governance, Data Surveillance, and Corporate Conduct as
Addressed by the United Nations, the International Court of
Justice, and the International Criminal Court

While there are sparse examples of major international regulations or customs
regarding data privacy and corporate liability in the social media context, the
U.N. has adopted major initiatives and resolutions regarding data privacy and the
use of the internet in general. Given the rapid development of the online sector
in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, the U.N. did not take concrete steps to
address international legal issues inherent in internet use until the 2000s. In 2001,
the U.N. General Assembly passed a resolution endorsing a World Summit on
the Information Society (WSIS) in two sessions in 2003 and 2005.72 This resolution encouraged all state governments, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and private sector actors to participate in the preparatory process of the WSIS and to participate at the Summit itself.73 The 2005
WSIS was held in Tunis, and the agenda asked the U.N. Secretary-General to
convene the first Internet Governance Forum (IGF) in 2006, which mandated
discussion of public policy concerns and emerging issues related to internet governance.74
In 2015, the U.N. General Assembly passed a resolution that extended the existing mandate of the IGF for ten years75 and reaffirmed that “the same rights that
people have offline must also be protected online.”76 The Resolution called upon
all Member States to review their policies “regarding the surveillance of communications . . . including mass surveillance, with a view to upholding the right
to privacy as set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights for States that are party to the
Covenant.”77 The Resolution more broadly called on Member States to “ensur[e]
the full and effective implementation of all [States’] obligations under international human rights law.”78 Most relevant to this Note, the 2015 Resolution called
72

G.A. Res. 56/183, ¶ 1 (Dec. 21, 2001).
Id. ¶¶ 4–5.
74
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72, WSIS-05/TUNIS/DOC/6(Rev. 1)-E (Nov. 18, 2005).
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upon Member States to cooperate with one another on “transnational issues of
information and communications technologies and the use thereof, including capacity-building and cooperation in combating the criminal misuse of the technologies and preventing the use of technology, communications and resources
for criminal or terrorist purposes.”79
While the IFG presents a useful forum for state and non-state actors to meet
and discuss current and anticipated public policy issues related to internet governance, systemic issues inherent in existing international legal regimes have arguably made it difficult for states to hold corporate actors accountable for their
conduct violating international human rights law (IHRL). One major roadblock
to ensuring corporate compliance with the principles of IHRL is that corporate
entities do not face international criminal liability under the Rome Statute, which
only grants the International Criminal Court (ICC) jurisdiction over “natural persons.”80 While superiors may be held criminally responsible for acts committed
by subordinates under the Rome Statute,81 the option to authorize the ICC to
pursue criminal charges directly against corporate entities as juridical persons
was rejected during the U.N. talks leading up to the signing of the Rome Statute
in July of 1998.82
Traditionally, States are the primary actors and subjects under international
law, while far fewer guiding treaties and customary international legal rules create individual private liability for breaches of international law.83 In a 1949 Advisory Opinion, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) explained that while a
non-state actor may be “an international person” and thus may be “a subject of
international law and capable of possessing international rights and duties,” this
does not mean that the non-state actor’s “legal personality and rights and duties
are the same as those of a State.”84 While not a binding decision on state actors,
this Advisory Opinion supports the theory that while a non-state organizational
actor may have international legal rights and duties as a result of its “capacity to
operate upon an international plane.”85 However, it does not necessarily follow
that the international legal rules which apply to state actors, specifically those
based in custom and general practice, apply equally to non-state actors.
79
80

Id. ¶ 53.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 25, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.

90.
81

Id. at art. 28.
David Scheffer, Corporate Liability Under the Rome Statute, 57 HARV. INT’L L. J. 35,
38 (2016). At least one scholar has pointed to the “insufficient number of national jurisdictions
that held corporations liable under criminal law, as opposed to civil tort liability” as a reason
for the rejection. Id.
83
States in International Law, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/international-law/States-in-international-law (last visited Oct. 8, 2020).
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In 2011, a Special Representative to the Secretary General developed the U.N.
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, which was unanimously endorsed by the U.N. Human Rights Council in June of 2011.86 The Human Rights
Council also established an Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group to
draft a legally binding treaty on business activities by transnational corporations
and human rights.87 This draft treaty specifically invokes the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and “the nine core International Human Rights Instruments” adopted by the U.N., 88 and defines “[h]uman rights violation or abuse”
as “any harm committed by a State or a business enterprise . . . against . . . any
persons or group of persons . . . including physical or mental injury, emotional
suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of their human rights, including environmental rights.”89 Despite the legal considerations pushing for international legal personality attaching to non-state actors, actual application in international legal frameworks lags due to policy concerns.90

ii. Internet Governance, Data Surveillance, and Corporate Conduct as
Addressed by Regional Organizations
While the development of comprehensive regulations pertaining to utilization
of user data and corporate accountability at the global level remains difficult
given clashing interests among the U.N.’s members, practical considerations
may indicate that regional and domestic regulatory regimes are better equipped
to address these issues. For instance, states who share borders and occupy distinct
regions of the world may share common policy interests tied to that region. Furthermore, the development of similar transnational policies and laws by multiple

86
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visited Mar. 28, 2021).
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U.N. Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Grp., Legally Binding Instrument to
Regulate, in International Human Rights Law, the Activities of Transnational Corporations
and Other Business Enterprises, pmbl. (June 8, 2020), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGTransCorp/Session6/OEIGWG_ChairRapporteur_second_revised_draft_LBI_on_TNCs_and_OBEs_with_respect_to_Human_Rights.pdf.
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states may facilitate multilateral agreements or even the emergence of customary
international law over time.
One regional organization that has arguably developed more effective legal
mechanisms relating to internet governance, data use, and corporate liability is
the EU. The European Dialogue on Internet Governance (EuroDIG), launched in
2008 and supported by the executive branch of the EU, “fosters dialogue and
collaboration with the Internet community on public policy for the Internet.”91
The EuroDIG serves to “support the general objectives of the global Internet
Governance Forum,” while also facilitating discussions aimed at “overcom[ing]
digital divides in Europe.”92 EuroDIG membership “is open to any natural or
legal person interested in supporting the purposes of EuroDIG,” and the powers
of members within the EuroDIG organization depend on the timing of when they
joined the Association.93 Such a structure incentivizes both state and non-state
actors to continually engage in EuroDIG discussions to better voice their opinions on certain policy issues and identify common ground.94
The most comprehensive internet regulatory scheme by the EU and arguably
by any international body, however, is the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR). Passed in April of 2016 by the European Parliament and Council of the
EU, the GDPR aims to “ensure a consistent level of protection” for the privacy
and data of “natural persons throughout the [EU],” as well as to “provide legal
certainty and transparency for economic operators.”95 While the GDPR suggests
that administrative fines should be imposed for infringement of the regulation’s
provisions, it leaves “the rules on criminal penalties for infringements” of the
GDPR to Member States.96 Furthermore, the GDPR does not apply to the processing of personal data “by competent authorities for . . . the prevention of
threats to public security.”97 Thus, should a state actor declare that a threat to
public security exists and that circumstances require heavier monitoring of the
population’s personal data, then the GDPR would arguably not apply.
Despite these weaknesses—allowing state actors to conduct surveillance over
individuals in certain situations and limiting criminal accountability for such
conduct—the GDPR exerts extraterritorial reach in some situations.98 Specifically, it may apply to “a controller or processor not established in the Union”
when that actor is processing “personal data of data subjects who are in the
91
About EuroDIG, EURODIG, https://www.eurodig.org/index.php?id=74 (last visited
Mar. 28, 2021).
92
Statutes, EURODIG SUPPORT ASSOCIATION, § 2 (June 20, 2019), https://www.eurodig.org/about/who-we-are/#tab-eurodig-statutes.
93
Id. § 4.
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Id. at pmbl. ¶¶ 148–49.
97
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Union,” albeit in limited circumstances.99 The GDPR says that both “controller[s]”—those with “the purposes and means of processing personal data”—as
well as a “processor[s]”—those who “process[] personal data on behalf of the
controller”—include “natural or legal person[s],” as well as “public authorit[ies].”100
As of 2019, critics of the GDPR have noted that while the regulation has found
“success as a breach notification law,” it has not been as effective “when it comes
to imposing fines on companies that fail to adequately protect their customers’
data.”101 Additionally, three Member States of the EU have still not fully adapted
their national legislation to implement the GDPR.102 At the national level, Member States of the EU must “set up and allocate powers to the national data protection authorities, lay down rules on specific issues . . . and amend or repeal
sectoral legislation with data protection aspects” to satisfy the GDPR.103 Despite
the apparent burdens that the GDPR places on corporations who fall under its
purview, the European Commission has argued that the GDPR actually “encourages the development of new technologies while respecting the fundamental
right to protection of personal data,” as businesses “have started developing . . .
new, more privacy-friendly services” and “have promoted respect for personal
data as a competitive differentiator and a selling point.”104
Furthermore, a “growing number of companies” have “extend[ed] . . . the
rights created by [GDPR] to their non-EU based customers” in response to increasing concerns worldwide regarding internet security.105 In addition to the direct reach of the GDPR, the Commission to the European Parliament and the
Council has “intensified its engagement with third countries and other international partners” in reaching agreements on internet privacy policies.106 One example of these agreements, the “EU-Japan mutual adequacy arrangement” that

99
Id. at art. 3(2) (explaining that controllers or processors who are “not established in the
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100
Id. at arts. 4(7)–(8).
101
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2019, 5:42 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2019/03/gdpr-one-year-anniversary-breach-notification-fines.html (noting that while penalties under the GDPR totaled over fifty-five million euros during the first nine months that the GDPR was in effect, a single fifty million euro
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entered into force in February of 2019, “created the world’s largest area of free
and safe data flows.”107 Member States of the EU have continued to develop
similar “adequacy” measures with non-EU States across the globe and to adapt
existing “adequacy decisions” with third countries to the newer GDPR framework.108
The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has also ruled on data privacy
and the permissibility of surveillance regimes. In 1978, the ECHR ruled that under the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (CPHRFF), signed by members of the Council of Europe,109 “Contracting
States [to the Convention] may not, in the name of the struggle against espionage
and terrorism, adopt whatever measures they deem appropriate.”110 The ECHR
stressed that despite the “certain discretion” that domestic legislatures have when
creating surveillance systems, “this does not mean that the Contracting States
enjoy an unlimited discretion to subject persons within their jurisdiction to secret
surveillance.”111 In a 2016 ruling, the ECHR explained that the proliferation of
digital surveillance tools raises “the question as to whether the development of
surveillance methods resulting in masses of data collected has been accompanied
by a simultaneous development of legal safeguards” that ensure the rights enshrined in the CPHRFF.112 Given these specific decisions by the ECHR, along
with others made pursuant to claims under the CPHRFF, the CPHRFF appears
to protect the data rights of citizens of Member States.
One major regional organization in Eurasia, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), arguably sacrificed the goals of user data protection and promotion of human rights in favor of promoting political stability and national security. China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan
announced the SCO in 2001, signed the SCO Charter in June of 2002, and entered the agreement into force in September of 2003.113 The SCO Charter expressly endorses “the strengthening of peace and ensuring of security and stability in the region in the environment of developing political multipolarity and
economic and information globalization.”114 In 2009, Member States of SCO
signed their own Agreement regarding “International Information Security.” In
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contrast to the GDPR, this Agreement focuses more heavily on “limiting the
spread and use of information weapons threatening defense capacity, national
security and public safety”115 than protecting personal user data. Under the
Agreement, SCO Member States exchange “information, analysis and joint assessment of emerging threats to information security, as well as identification,
reconciliation and coordination of joint responses to these threats.”116 Furthermore, the Agreement mandates SCO Member States to carry out its provisions
“consistent with universally recognized principles and norms of the international
law, including . . . respect for human rights.”117
Critics of the SCO highlighted “human rights concerns raised by SCO structure, policies, and practices,” namely those activities by the SCO carried out in
the name of counterterrorism.118 The SCO’s “‘come as you are’ approach of noninterference in internal affairs,” as well as its “prioritization of member state stability,” garnered it international appeal from states who face internal security
threats.119 The SCO’s approach to counter-terrorism reflects China’s continual
focus on fighting the “Three Evil Forces,” typically defined as “terrorism, ethnic
separatism, and religious extremism.”120 The SCO’s focus has led to “crackdowns and abuses related to individual exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms” including “discrimination against and targeting of ethnic and other vulnerable groups.”121
Despite the human rights concerns voiced against the SCO, the U.N. has
“granted the SCO observer status and continues to pursue expanded cooperation”
with the organization, which critics have warned may “contribute to the strengthening of a regional approach that is undermining international human rights.”122
The EU remains more skeptical of the legitimacy of some of the SCO’s practices;
one resolution from the European Parliament in 2014 recognized “the absence of
any formal cooperation mechanism between the SCO and the EU,” as well as
“divergences in [the EU’s and the SCO’s] respective normative bases and

115
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outlooks on global issues.”123 A Briefing from the European Parliament Research
Service (EPRS) noted that while the SCO Charter mandates “the protection of
human rights as an obligation of individual member states under international
law,” this voiced obligation “is clearly subordinated to the fight against separatist, extremist and terrorist groups.”124 The Briefing further noted that the
SCO’s focus on combatting these groups involves “the suppression of riots and
uprisings, and even peaceful dissent,” by the individual member states of the
SCO.125
Outside observers have called the SCO’s stances on internet governance, data
surveillance, and the protection of human rights into question. In examining the
International Code of Conduct for Information Security proposal that the SCO
submitted to the U.N. General Assembly in 2011 and 2015, one NGO argued that
“[t]he SCO states may view the Code as a vehicle to redefine application of international human rights law.”126 According to one critic, even after “taking into
consideration” suggestions from the international community in 2011, the 2015
Code of Conduct proposal “still raise[d] serious concerns with respect to human
rights,” as the Code’s narrative “emphasize[d] state sovereignty and territoriality
in the digital space above all else, and [wa]s dominated by intelligence, national
security, and regime stability imperatives.”127 Another critic of the SCO believes
that the SCO is forwarding a “proposed norm” under international law through
its vision of data surveillance and internet governance under the proposed
Code.128 They further believe that reactions to the acts of States such as Russia
and China by actors such as the United States help perpetuate this “proposed
norm” of territorial sovereignty in the digital space.129 In short, the internet governance and data surveillance stances of the SCO and of its most influential member states, namely China, reflect a view of international human rights law that
opposes the pro-individual rights view held by the EU, ECHR, and Council.
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iii. Internet Governance, Data Surveillance, and Corporate Conduct as
Addressed by Transnational Laws and Policies

Several States have domestic legislation that imposes sanctions on foreign individuals and entities that are involved in human rights abuses. The Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Magnitsky Act), one major piece of
such legislation, was passed by the United States Congress in 2016.130 Under the
Magnitsky Act as passed, foreign persons131 could be sanctioned for “gross violations of internationally recognized human rights” based on credible evidence.132 Further, the U.S. President may sanction corporations for committing
human rights violations themselves, as well as for “act[ing] as an agent of or on
behalf of a foreign person” who commits these violations.133 In 2017, President
Donald Trump modified the Magnitsky Act via executive order to broaden the
scope of liability for foreign actors, namely changing the “gross” standard for
violations to “serious.”134 Under the Magnitsky Act, the United States can bar
foreign persons, both individuals and entities, from entering the country and can
“block” transactions of property within the United States.135
The European Parliament of the EU, taking count of the Magnitsky Act and
similar “Magnitsky laws” that enable governments to impose targeted sanctions,
passed a resolution urging adoption of similar standards for all its Member States,
as well as at the EU level.136 In addition to providing deterrence for potential
human rights abusers, some groups have noted that the Magnitsky Act and similar transnational laws provide incentives to foreign governments to improve
their own accountability.137

130
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While laws such as the Magnitsky Act seem to offer a valid avenue for pursuing claims against foreign corporations and actors for human rights abuses, the
ability for domestic courts to hear individual claims against foreign corporations
remains in question. In 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Alien Tort
Statute (ATS), which allows U.S. district courts to hear civil claims by aliens for
torts “committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States,”138 should not extend liability to foreign corporations.139 The U.S. Supreme Court had previously held that the ATS does not grant relief “for violations of the law of nations occurring outside the United States.”140
In 2017, France passed a law that holds corporations liable under French law
for human rights abuses committed by those companies, their subcontractors, and
their suppliers.141 The law mandates that certain companies, depending on their
size and their presence in France, implement an “effective vigilance plan.”142
Penalties are imposed only in the instance that the corporation does not adopt
“due diligence measures.”143 However, the penalty provision of the French law
was struck down in March of 2017 by the French Constitutional Council due to
vague language in the statute.144 While observers have noted that other portions
of the Constitutional Council’s decision have deprived the French law of some
of its “fundamental provisions,” they also note that the current version’s enforcement mechanisms have allowed interested parties to request compensation under
French common civil law.145 The domestic laws’ limitation of domestic courts
represent an ongoing struggle to reconcile the vastly different foundations and
principles between domestic and international bodies of law, as well as the ability
for domestic courts to successfully adjudicate claims against foreign defendants.
Many other States are currently developing laws that seek to ensure corporate
accountability for human rights abuses in these contexts. In April of 2019, the
United Kingdom announced the introduction of an independent regulator to
138
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[J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Mar. 23, 2017, p. 1–2.
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Id. at p. 1.
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Id. at p. 2.
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Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2017-750DC, Mar.
23, 2017, Rec. 13, ¶ 14 (Fr.).
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Sandra Cossart, Opinion, What Lessons Does France’s Duty of Vigilance Law Have for
Other National Initiatives?, BUS. & HUM. RTS. RES. CTR. (June 27, 2019), https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/blog/what-lessons-does-frances-duty-of-vigilance-law-have-forother-national-initiatives/.
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ensure that social media companies and tech firms “protect their users and face
tough penalties if they do not comply.”146 Under the proposed rules, companies
could face substantial fines and senior management individuals could face personal liability.147 Germany also passed its own “Network Enforcement Law” in
2017, which holds social media companies that have at least two million users in
Germany liable for fines up to fifty million euros if they fail to delete comments
and posts deemed to violate German law.148 Both the German and British laws
ensure harsh penalties for companies that violate domestic law, yet both apparently lack extraterritorial reach and have faced criticism for their elements of
censorship.149 Admittedly, domestic laws from various states do not perfectly
ensure that foreign corporate entities can truly be held accountable for their complicity in or active perpetration of human rights violations. Nonetheless, they can
be deployed relatively quickly and are more targeted in scope than existing international and other multilateral legal accountability mechanisms.

146
Press Release, UK to Introduce World First Online Safety Laws (Apr. 8, 2019),
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-to-introduce-world-first-online-safety-laws.
147
Matthew S. Schwartz, U.K. Regulators Propose Broad Social Media Regulations to
Counter
‘Online
Harms’,
NPR
(Apr.
8,
2019,
8:18
PM),
https://www.npr.org/2019/04/08/711091689/u-k-regulators-propose-broad-social-media-regulations-to-counter-online-harms.
148
Soraya Sarhaddi Nelson, With Huge Fines, German Law Pushes Social Networks to
Delete Abusive Posts, NPR (Oct. 31, 2017, 7:44 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/10/31/561024666/with-huge-fines-german-law-pushes-social-networks-to-deleteabusive-posts.
149
Id. (“[C]ritics of the new law call it an assault on free speech that is more likely to
increase censorship than to decrease fake news and hate speech.”).
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ANALYSIS

A. Existing International Law, Transnational Accountability Mechanisms,
and the Human Rights Violations in Xinjiang

i. China’s Ability to Prevent Meaningful Action by U.N. Bodies and
Growing Soft Power Severely Hinder International Legal Action
Against Chinese Corporations and the Chinese State on the
Global Level for the Atrocities in Xinjiang

China’s position on the U.N. Security Council, as well as its ideological and
economic influence over authoritarian-leaning regimes worldwide,150 has made
it difficult to develop a global consensus among states against the extensive human rights violations committed by the Chinese State and by corporations operating in the Xinjiang region. China and other nations on the U.N. Security Council have not reached a consensus over the treatment of the Uyghur and other
minority groups in Xinjiang, and some states have rejected forms of U.N. action
in Xinjiang that could validate China’s justifications for the treatment of these
minority groups.151
Under the U.N. Charter, action by the Security Council requires affirmative
votes of nine of the fifteen members, including all five of the permanent members, for all non-procedural matters.152 The Security Council has the power to
impose sanctions in order to “give effect to its decisions,”153 and through 2020
had sanctioned nearly 300 entities.154 This has included sanctions against privately-owned companies who committed violations of Security Council

150
See Rule by Fear: 30 Years After Tiananmen Square: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Foreign Rels., 116th Cong. 4–8 (2019) (statement of Christopher Walker, Vice President,
Studies & Analysis, National Endowment for Democracy).
151
U.S., Germany Slam China at U.N. Security Council over Xinjiang: Diplomats,
REUTERS (July 2, 2019, 7:06 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-usa-rights/us-germany-slam-china-at-un-security-council-over-xinjiang-diplomats-idUSKCN1TX2YZ (“Last
month the United States, Britain and other western countries objected to a visit by the United
Nations counterterrorism chief to Xinjiang, concerned the visit would validate China’s argument that it was tackling terrorism.”).
152
U.N. Charter art. 27, ¶ 3.
153
Id. at art. 41.
154
The UN Security Council, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS. (Sept. 16, 2020),
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/un-security-council.
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resolutions.155 But given China’s position as a permanent member of the Security
Council,156 it can veto any sort of non-procedural action that the Security Council
could take to stop the ongoing human rights abuses in Xinjiang, which includes
blocking any potential U.N. Security Council sanctions against violating Chinese
companies.
In any instance, while the U.N. Security Council holds the power to take action
against threats to international peace and security,157 responsibility for the protection of equal rights and self-determination of the citizens of U.N. member
States falls on the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council.158
Although the Security Council “at times[] deals with grave human rights violations,” these investigations often are tied to “conflict areas.”159 Thus, even if the
Security Council could recommend action against the Chinese State and Chinese
corporations for the human rights abuses in Xinjiang, China may have a valid
argument that the U.N. Security Council lacks the power to handle this sort of
dispute.
Within the U.N. General Assembly, there are competing views on the situation
in Xinjiang and its legality under international law. In October of 2019, a faction
of twenty-three countries raised concerns over the human rights abuses at the
U.N. General Assembly and called upon China to uphold its international obligations and to provide access to Xinjiang for international monitors.160 In response, Belarus made a statement on behalf of fifty-four countries, voicing approval of China’s “counter-terrorism” program in Xinjiang.161 This represented
an increase from the thirty-seven nations that supported China’s Xinjiang policies in July of 2019.162
In its 2018 report on China, the U.N. Human Rights Council Working Group
on the Universal Period Review called upon China to implement the recommendations made by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in

155

See, e.g., U.N. Sec. Council, Sanctions Against Butembo Airlines (BAL) (Mar. 29,
2007) (sanctioning a “[p]rivately-owned airline” for providing assistance to illegal armed
groups in violation of Security Council resolutions).
156
U.N. Charter art. 23, ¶ 1.
157
U.N. Charter art. 39.
158
U.N. Charter art. 60.
159
Protect Human Rights, U.N., https://www.un.org/en/sections/what-we-do/protect-human-rights/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2021).
160
Ben Westcott & Richard Roth, UN Members Issue Dueling Statements over China’s
Treatment of Uyghurs in Xinjiang, CNN (Oct. 29, 2019, 11:33 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/29/asia/china-xinjiang-united-nations-intl-hnk/index.html.
161
Id. (“‘The joint statement spoke positively of the results of counter-terrorism and deradicalization measures in Xinjiang and noted that these measures have effectively safeguarded the basic human rights of people of all ethnic groups,’ representatives for Belarus said
in a press release.”).
162
Id.
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August 2018 regarding Xinjiang.163 The report also noted China’s stance that the
State “resolutely opposed and would never accept the practice of using human
rights as an excuse to interfere in its internal affairs and undermine its sovereignty and territorial integrity.”164 Unsurprisingly, China declined to implement
these recommendations and instead suggested that monitors and journalists could
only enter Xinjiang in accordance with Chinese law, while affirming the State’s
strong opposition to “interference in its sovereignty and internal affairs under
any pretext.”165
This conditioning of human rights on Chinese domestic security interests
should draw condemnation from top U.N. officials given the principles of equal
rights and self-determination espoused in Article 55 of the U.N. Charter.166 However, U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has refrained from commenting
on growing evidence of the abuses in Xinjiang and instead has supported China’s
justifications for the surveillance and detention regime in Xinjiang.167 Within the
U.N., China has used its membership on the Economic and Social Council’s
NGO Committee to block U.N. accreditation for those NGOs critical of China.168
China’s position on the Security Council, as well as its active role in the U.N. as
the head of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs and the second-largest funder of the U.N. regular budget,169 have weakened the efforts of those U.N.
Member States who oppose the ongoing human rights violations in Xinjiang. As
China continues to find support from other autocratic regimes worldwide,

163

Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review of
China in its Thirty-First Session, ¶ 28.23, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/40/6 (2018) (France calling on
China to “[i]mplement all of the recommendations of the Committee on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination of August 2018 regarding Xinjiang, particularly on putting an end to
mass internments in camps, and invite the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights and special procedure experts”).
164
Id. ¶ 27.
165
Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review of
China in its Thirty-First Session Addendum, ¶ 28.22, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/40/6/Add.1 (2018).
166
See U.N. Charter art. 55(c) (requiring promotion of “universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion”).
167
Daily Press Briefing by Stéphane Dujarric, Spokesman for the Secretary-General, Office of the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General (Nov. 18, 2019),
https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/db191118.doc.htm (“[The Secretary-General’s] position
on the situation [in Xinjiang] is that there needs to be full respect for the unity and territorial
integrity of China, condemnation of terrorist attacks, as no cause or grievances can justify
them.”).
168
The Costs of International Advocacy, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Sept. 5, 2017),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/09/05/costs-international-advocacy/chinas-interferenceunited-nations-human-rights.
169
Courtney J. Fung, Is China’s Influence at the United Nations all it’s Cracked Up to
Be?, WASH. POST (Oct. 7, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/
10/07/is-chinas-influence-united-nations-all-that-its-cracked-up-be/.
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China’s position in the U.N. has allowed it to use this growing support to legitimize its views despite the State’s blatant disregard for the foundational human
rights principles of the U.N.
ii. Current International Conventions and Legal Instruments Relating
to Protection of Data Rights and Accountability of Corporations
Are Insufficient in Deterring Human Rights Violations by China
and Chinese Companies
China has signed but not ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),170 which obligates State parties to ensure equal rights for
all individuals “without distinction of any kind.”171 The ICCPR prohibits parties
who are acting “[i]n time of public emergency” to discriminate against individuals solely on the ground of certain statuses, including religion.172 Thus, if China
were a party to the ICCPR, the surveillance mechanisms deployed by the Chinese
State against the Uyghur Muslim population of Xinjiang would violate China’s
obligations under the convention. China’s justifications national security justifications would not avoid violation, as Chinese corporations detain Uyghur Muslims based on the presence of religious imagery and messages on their social
networks.173
China has neither signed nor ratified the 1976 Optional Protocol to the
ICCPR,174 which allows parties to bring claims to the Human Rights Committee
set up by the Covenant.175 However, even under the Protocol, communications
to the Committee are only admissible when they communicate a violation of the

170
Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard, U.N. HUM. RTS. OFF. OF THE HIGH
COMM’R (Feb. 9, 2021), https://indicators.ohchr.org/ (click on the “Select a treaty” dropdown
menu and select “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”).
171
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171.
172
Id. at art. 4, ¶ 1.
173
See Darren Byler, How Technology Liberated China’s Uighur Minority–and then
Trapped Them, QUARTZ (Oct. 1, 2019), https://qz.com/1719581/technology-liberated-chinasuighur-minority-and-then-trapped-them/ (explaining that Chinese authorities have “mapped
out [a] person’s social network and history of Islamic practice, both in their local community
and online,” in assessing security threats).
174
Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard, supra note 170 (click on the “Select a
treaty” dropdown menu and select “Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights”).
175
See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts.
2, 5, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302 (allowing parties to overcome domestic remedy exhaustion requirements “where the application of the remedies is unreasonably prolonged”).
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ICCPR by the State, not violation by a private party such as a private company.176
However, the Committee has interpreted the ICCPR as requiring States to regulate and adjudicate private corporate acts in order to protect against abuse.177
Thus, the Human Rights Committee accepts communications where the State has
“failed to take steps to prevent, investigate, punish or redress wrongdoing by
private actors, including business enterprises.”178
In the case of Xinjiang, were China party to the ICCPR and its Optional Protocol, communications from repressed minority groups to the Human Rights
Committee would be admissible, given that the Chinese State not only forces
Chinese companies to comply with its abusive policies but also places Chinese
Communist Party officials within the management structures of rising Chinese
companies.179 Furthermore, the Human Rights Committee can hear communications under the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR regarding violations of the
ICCPR not only in the territory of a State party, but also regarding abuses against
individuals outside the State’s territory.180 However, the Committee has not explicitly addressed these situations where a corporation acts on the State’s behalf
outside the national territory of the State in question.181
While the above provisions of the ICCPR and the Optional Protocol to the
ICCPR provide a route to holding private corporations accountable for human
rights violations, China has indicated that its ratification of the ICCPR depends
on “whether relevant conditions in China are in place.”182 Given that China
signed the ICCPR in 1998, NGOs have called into question when these “relevant
conditions” would be “in place.”183 Thus, so long as the ICCPR would allow the
Human Rights Committee to investigate human rights violations committed by
corporate actors influenced by a State, it remains highly unlikely that China will
ratify the ICCPR. Regardless, given that China repeatedly advocates for limiting
176

John G. Ruggie (Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and Transnational Corporations
and Other Business Enterprises), State Responsibilities to Regulate and Adjudicate Corporate
Activities Under the United Nations’ Core Human Rights Treaties, 4 (June 2007).
177
Id. at 19.
178
Id. at 4.
179
See Freedom in the World 2019: China, supra note 69. But see State Responsibilities
to Regulate and Adjudicate Corporate Activities under the United Nations’ Core Human
Rights Treaties, supra note 176, p. 54, ¶ 179 (“It is unclear under which conditions the HRC
considers that a company, while not part of the State apparatus, may nevertheless be considered to engage directly the responsibility of the State because it acts under the State’s direction,
control or instructions.”).
180
State Responsibilities to Regulate and Adjudicate Corporate Activities Under the
United Nations’ Core Human Rights Treaties, supra note 176, ¶ 147, at 46.
181
Id. ¶ 155, at 48.
182
Rep. of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review of China in its ThirtyFirst Session Addendum, supra note 165, ¶ 28.5.
183
See Sophie Richardson, Inconvenient Truths at China’s UN Rights Review, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (Mar. 13, 2019, 5:28 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/03/13/inconvenienttruths-chinas-un-rights-review.
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interpretations of human rights law to accommodate national security and sovereignty concerns,184 the Chinese State would likely provide bad faith arguments
to skirt its obligations under the ICCPR even if it were a party.
While a few multilateral legal instruments exist that effectively ensure the protection of user data from digital surveillance, these international legal obligations
cannot currently hold Chinese tech and social media corporations liable for aiding the Chinese State in committing the human rights violations in Xinjiang. The
GDPR does have extraterritorial application outside of the EU to organizations
that either offer goods and services to people in the EU or monitor the behavior
of individuals in the EU.185 Specifically, if a corporation uses web tools that track
cookies or IP addresses of those who visit the corporation’s website from EU
countries, then that corporation falls under the scope of the GDPR.186 However,
those involved in administering the GDPR have questioned how this extraterritorial reach based on monitoring would actually be enforced.187 Furthermore,
even under the GDPR a member state may limit the data rights of individuals by
domestic legislative measure when necessary to safeguard national security or
other crucial state interests.188
While both the GDPR and the the Chinese Cybersecurity Law (CSL) have
similar conceptions of what constitutes “personal data,”189 the CSL focuses heavily on tying the ideas of cybersecurity and data protection together.190 Given
China’s aforementioned justifications for the surveillance and abuse of the Uyghur people in Xinjiang relating to national security concerns and anti-terrorism
initiatives, China’s promotion of data protection in the CSL rings hollow.
The SCO’s approach to promoting strong cybersecurity mechanisms that ensure political stability, as previously discussed, reflect China’s view that national
political and security interests trump equal treatment of individuals regardless of
184

Abbas Faiz, China is Building a Global Coalition of Human Rights Violators to Defend
its Record in Xinjiang – What is its Endgame?, CONVERSATION (July 18, 2019, 9:05 AM),
https://theconversation.com/china-is-building-a-global-coalition-of-human-rights-violatorsto-defend-its-record-in-xinjiang-what-is-its-endgame-120546 (“China’s approach has been to
engage with the UN’s human rights bodies to impose its own narrative, which misinterprets
sovereignty as being distinct and above human rights.”).
185
Ben Wolford, Does the GDPR Apply to Companies Outside of the EU?, GDPR.EU,
https://gdpr.eu/companies-outside-of-europe/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2019).
186
Id.
187
See id. (“Practically speaking, it’s unclear how strictly this provision will be interpreted
or how brazenly it will be enforced.”).
188
See Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 95, at art. 23 (restrictions must “respect[]
the essence of the fundamental rights and freedoms and is a necessary and proportionate measure”).
189
See Galaad Delval & Zhong Lin, GDPR Matchup: China’s Cybersecurity Law, INT’L
ASSOC. OF PRIV. PRO. (June 28, 2017), https://iapp.org/news/a/gdpr-matchup-chinas-cybersecurity-law/ (comparing the definition of personal data in Article 4.1 of the GDPR with the
definition of personal information given in Article 76.5 of the CSL).
190
Id.
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their religious affiliation. The State parties to the SCO submitted a letter to the
U.N. General Assembly in 2015, proposing an International Code of Conduct for
application of “new information and communication technologies.”191 The proposal promotes recognition that “the rights of an individual in the offline environment must also be protected in the online environment,” and then references
Article 19 of the ICCPR,192 which concerns the freedom of expression.193 Both
Article 19 and SCO’s proposal to the U.N. assert that the freedom of expression
may be curtailed “[f]or the protection of national security or of public order.”194
Nevertheless, China is not a party to the ICCPR,195 and thus its participation in
endorsing that portion of the 2015 proposed Code of Conduct appears to be in
bad faith.
Additionally, the 2015 proposed Code of Conduct emphasizes a State’s “right
to independent control of information and communications technology
goods.”196 This reflects China’s intensive regulation of its domestic tech companies, specifically its control over what information Chinese platforms should
censor or what digital materials are targeted for surveillance by the Chinese State.
Given the Chinese State’s heavy regulation of its domestic corporate actors in
the tech and social media industries and the continued drive of the Communist
Party’s leadership to suppress political dissent and cement regime stability, it
seems highly unlikely that the China would currently become a party to an instrument such as the GDPR.
The U.N. Human Rights Council contains a working group that has been developing an international convention “to regulate, in international human rights
law, the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises.”197 China specifically voted in favor of establishing the working group.198
191
Permanent Reps. of China, Kaz., Kyrg., Russ., Taj. & Uzb., Letter dated Jan. 9, 2015
from the Permanent Representatives of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to the United Nations Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/69/723
(Jan. 13, 2015) [hereinafter Letter to the Secretary General].
192
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193
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 171, at art. 19(2).
194
Id. at art. 19(3)(b); Letter to the Secretary General, supra note 191, ¶ 7.
195
Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard, supra note 170.
196
Letter to the Secretary General, supra note 191, ¶ 5.
197
Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group on Transnational Corporations and
Other Business Enterprises with Respect to Human Rights, U.N. HUM. RTS. COUNCIL,
https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/hrc/wgtranscorp/pages/igwgontnc.aspx (last visited Apr.
10, 2021).
198
Human Rights Council Res. 26/9, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/26/9 (July 14, 2014) (“In
favour: Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, China, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Ethiopia, India,
Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Morocco, Namibia, Pakistan, Philippines, Russian Federation,
South Africa, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam; Against: Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Montenegro, Republic of Korea, Romania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America; Abstaining: Argentina, Botswana, Brazil, Chile, Costa
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The draft report of this legally binding instrument states that its regulation would
apply to all business activities, “including but not limited to transnational corporations and other business enterprises that undertake business activities of a transnational nature.”199 Article 5 of the proposed instrument would oblige member
States to ensure that their domestic laws require all persons conducting business
activities to respect human rights and prevent human rights violations and
abuses.200 Furthermore, the draft instrument defines “[b]usiness activities” as
“including but not limited to productive or commercial activity . . . including activities undertaken by electronic means.”201 However, the definition of “[h]uman
rights violation or abuse” under Article 1 of the instrument does not present an
exhaustive list202 and therefore the exact situations where corporations would be
held liable under the instrument remains unclear. Thus, even under the draft instrument it remains uncertain to what extent Chinese corporations could be held
liable for the surveillance and censoring mechanisms in Xinjiang.
Even if China was potentially liable, there’s a question as to whether China
would become party to such a multilateral legal instrument in the first place. Article 12 of the proposed instrument allows defendants to refuse recognition and
enforcement by a court with jurisdiction after a claim has been brought “where
the judgment is manifestly contrary to the [public order] of the Party in which its
recognition is sought.”203 The draft also affirms that State obligations under the
proposed instrument should be carried out “in a manner consistent with, and fully
respecting, the principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity of States
and that of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other States.”204 Thus, even
if China became a party to this instrument, it likely would continue to shield its
corporations from international liability on the grounds of sovereignty and nonintervention in domestic affairs.

Rica, Gabon, Kuwait, Maldives, Mexico, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, United Arab Emirates[.]”).
199
U.N. Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Grp. on Transnat’l Corps. & Other Bus.
Enters. with Respect to Hum. Rts., Legally Binding Instrument to Regulate, in International
Human Rights Law, the Activities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, art. 3 § 1, (July 16, 2019), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGTransCorp/Session6/OEIGWG_ChairRapporteur_second_revised_draft_LBI_on_TNCs_and_OBEs_with_respect_to_Human_Rights.pdf.
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Id. at art. 5(1).
201
Id. at art. 1(3).
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See id. at art. 1(2) (defining violations as “acts or omissions in the context of business
activities, against any person or group of persons, individually or collectively, including physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of their
human rights, including environmental rights”).
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Id. at art. 12(9)(c).
204
Id. at art. 14(1).
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As evidenced above, existing and developing multilateral legal instruments
relating to corporate accountability for human rights violations ineffectively ensure liability for those Chinese corporate actors that have aided the Chinese State
in monitoring and detaining Uyghurs in Xinjiang on the basis of their religious
and ethnic affiliations. The primacy of non-interference in domestic matters echoes in the majority of multilateral instruments that could apply to this situation,
and China has increasingly cultivated a consensus of States that support the primacy of sovereignty over the protection of human rights and individual privacy.
B. Additional Considerations in Developing a Consensus on International
Standards for Corporate Liability and Human Rights Instruments that
Reach Corporate Actors Who Are Shielded by Powerful States
China’s soft power on the international stage has severely hampered international consensus against China’s use of domestic corporate actors to monitor the
Xinjiang region and to persecute minority groups in the region. As previously
discussed, various States have begun implementing their own versions of the
Global Magnitsky Act, the transnational law that holds private individuals and
corporations accountable for human rights violations.205 While that Act in its
current form can only prevent transactions between domestic and foreign companies,206 should enough States adopt similar provisions they could increasingly
restrict the ability of Chinese companies involved in the abuses in Xinjiang from
conducting business outside of China. These types of measures would most effectively pressure those Chinese companies with major markets outside of China,
such as Hikvision Digital Technology and Zhejiang Dahua Technology.207 Even
then, many Chinese firms are partially—or fully—controlled by Chinese State
actors, such as the China Electronics Technology Corporation.208 Some argue
that sanctions by the United States have not driven China towards reforming its
policies, but rather encourage the Chinese State to become more involved in

205

The US Global Magnitsky Act: Questions and Answers, supra note 137.
Id.
207
See Olivia Carville & Jeremy Kahn, China’s Hikvision Has Probably Filmed You,
BLOOMBERG (May 24, 2019, 10:25 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-0522/china-s-hikvision-weighed-for-u-s-ban-has-probably-filmed-you (“Together, the two companies control one-third of the global market for video surveillance, according to a report by
Deutsche Bank AG, with their cameras securing businesses, airports, schools and government
offices in the U.S.—and around the world.”).
208
See Buckley & Mozur, supra note 5 (“Hikvision is a major manufacturer of video surveillance equipment, with customers around the world and across Xinjiang, where its cameras
have been installed at mosques and detention camps. C.E.T.C. owns about 42 percent of the
company through subsidiaries.”).
206
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growing the domestic Chinese tech market.209 Thus, the pressure from these
Magnitsky-type sections would not necessarily deter these types of firms as they
might deter entirely-private firms.
Another issue with Magnitsky-type legal regimes is that the imposition of
sanctions tend to harm the profits of domestic companies from the imposing
State.210 Additionally, Chinese firms can circumvent sanctions implemented under laws such as the Global Magnitsky Act by instead buying products from
States that have not yet imposed similar laws.211 Thus, while these types of sanctions may harm Chinese tech firms who wish to do business outside of China,
they only do so to the extent that numerous States have imposed similar laws that
effectively block a specific market for Chinese firms.
Given that organizations such as the EU have avoided concrete measures
against China and Chinese firms for the human rights abuses in Xinjiang,212
States must take initiative to craft domestic laws that specifically target these
Chinese firms. However, States have been hesitant to pressure domestic companies from engaging in business in Xinjiang outside of formal sanction regimes.213
Global marketplaces have additionally complicated efforts to harm the profits of
Chinese tech companies that have participated in the abuses in Xinjiang, as Chinese companies can rely on complex chains of suppliers and vendors to avoid
direct transactions that would violate sanction regimes.214 Thus, States continue
209
Reva Goujon, By Mixing Tech and Human Rights Sanctions on China, the White House
Crosses the Rubicon, STRATFOR WORLDVIEW (Nov. 1, 2019, 9:30 GMT),
https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/tech-human-rights-us-sanctions-china-trade-war.
210
See Jenny Leonard & Ian King, Five Months After Huawei Export Ban, U.S. Companies
Are Confused, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2019-10-24/huawei-export-ban-us-companies-confusion (reporting that tech leaders and their lawyers argued for months in closed-door meetings with Trump administration
officials that the blacklisting of Huawei—one of their biggest customers—is detrimental to
their businesses).
211
See id. (“One of the industry’s main arguments for allowing shipments of non-national
security-sensitive items is that Huawei can buy some of those components from competitors
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to face a variety of challenges related to the complexity of contemporary global
markets, as well as the Chinese State’s heavy drive to grow its domestic tech
industry, in formulating their own sanctions regimes to address the human rights
violations in Xinjiang.
Rapid technological advancement in the past two centuries further complicates the situation, as it has debatably left international law to catch up to these
trends after serious international issues have emerged. Specifically, in the case
of Xinjiang, it appears that very few international legal instruments effectively
reach the digital surveillance and complex censorship tactics employed by Chinese corporations in furtherance of the Chinese Communist Party’s goals. The
emergence of social media in the twenty-first century specifically has called into
question the state-centric approach to international law, as individuals worldwide
have increasingly pushed for the right to express themselves and to maintain data
privacy in the face of increasing government monitoring of social networks for
political purposes.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The situation in Xinjiang presents unique challenges to those international actors who seek to hold Chinese tech corporations accountable for their complicity
and active aid in the human rights abuses against the Uyghur people by the Chinese State. These challenges cumulatively prevent expedited multilateral efforts
to stop the abuses in Xinjiang, and instead force States to work from the ground
up to form a consensus against the actions of these Chinese corporations. Only
through building a strong consensus, facilitated through passing domestic laws
and discussions with NGOs and important multinational corporations in the tech
industry, can States effectively hold these Chinese corporations accountable for
their role in the human rights abuses in Xinjiang.
First, China’s immense influence on the global stage and role within the U.N.
prevents meaningful inquiries into the violation of human rights in Xinjiang.
China can formally block many forms of action through its position on the U.N.
Security Council and through its participation in human rights-oriented U.N.
bodies. Additionally, China’s soft power, which China utilizes through foreign
investment in and the sharing of surveillance technology with other authoritarian
regimes, have resulted in a pushback against human rights protectors that frames
China’s Xinjiang abuses in terms of territorial sovereignty and the right to conduct internal affairs. States that seek to form consensus at the U.N. level against
the surveillance and detention regime in Xinjiang must continue to push for the
promotion of human rights over potential economic gain and political interests.
Second, existing multilateral legal instruments relating to corporate accountability and data protection cannot adequately address the conduct of the Chinese
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tech firms that participate in the ongoing abuses in Xinjiang. China is not a party
to many major multilateral regimes that would entail obligations to respect the
rights of the Uyghur people, such as the ICCPR. Furthermore, international law,
particularly in the form of customary international law, has not yet caught up to
rapid development of technology in the twenty-first century and the recent emergence of social media as a major form of communication for societies across the
globe. While some organizations, such as the EU, have developed their own regulatory regimes that aim to protect user data and ensure corporate accountability,
others such as the SCO have developed competing conceptions of “data privacy”
that make individual rights subordinate to the government’s political interests.
Lastly, the interconnectedness of contemporary global markets has incentivized companies to continue to engage with Chinese tech firms in Xinjiang and
with the Chinese market on the whole. China’s rapidly developing domestic tech
industry has resulted in an export of Chinese tech worldwide, and multinational
corporations are incentivized to participate in the Chinese market due to its sheer
size. Without broad multilateral efforts to boycott products from these Chinese
tech companies and to refrain from engaging in the Chinese market, sanctions on
the individual State level often end up harming that State’s own markets, as Chinese companies can simply find another trade partner that lacks these formal
sanctions.
Given these challenges, I believe effective action against the Chinese tech
firms that facilitate the human rights abuses in Xinjiang starts at the individual
level. States must pass their own domestic laws that specifically criminalize and
punish foreign corporations for the types of conduct that have led to the human
rights abuses in Xinjiang. Specifically, States must promote the protection of the
freedom of expression and data privacy over economic gain and should restrict
trade with foreign corporations to the extent that these corporations do not respect these individual rights.
Domestic laws such as the Global Magnitsky Act address human rights abuses
by corporate actors to some extent, but these laws are not yet widely adopted.
Corporations in the tech industry, including those that host social media platforms, must themselves develop internal codes of conduct that obligate corporate
management to protect human rights over making a profit off human rights
abuses. States cannot work at the U.N. level alone to develop these instruments,
as China’s position on the Security Council and ability to garner support from
authoritarian regimes prevents meaningful consensus within U.N. bodies that
could push for accountability. States should continue to engage in discussions
with NGOs and tech corporations as to how to best protect human rights while
conducting foreign businesses and should encourage other States to join in on
these discussions.
States must actively and harshly rebuke the common “national security” and
“anti-terrorism” justifications for these abuses as forwarded by authoritarian
States such as China. While States should show restraint in directing the conduct
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of its own domestic corporate actors in response to the crisis in Xinjiang, they
should frame policies and sanction regimes against Chinese tech corporations
involved in Xinjiang in terms of their own human rights and international legal
obligations. Through developing a strong consensus against the corporate abuses
in Xinjiang, States can not only more effectively negotiate for multilateral legal
instruments that address corporate accountability for human rights abuses, but
also may encourage the development of customary international law over time
that addresses the type of conduct in question.

